

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01053 071428Z

44

ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIEP-03 SAJ-01 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 IO-14 EB-11 COME-00

FEAE-00 SCI-06 FPC-01 DRC-01 /155 W

----- 123404

R 071035Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1902

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMCONGEN DHAHRAN

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY SANAA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 1053

KUWAIT ALSO PASS DOHA AND MUSCAT; BEIRUT ALSO PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR TC SA

SUBJECT: FURTHER COMMENTS ON UAE-SAUDI AGREEMENT

REF: ABU DHABI 1009

1. SUMMARY. WHILE DETAILS OF UAE-SAUDI AGREEMENT STILL NOT REPEAT NOT AVAILABLE, IT IS ASSUMED HERE THAT AGREEMENT FULLY RESOLVES BORDER PROBLEM AND WILL LEAD IN DUE COURSE TO ESTABLISHMENT UAE-SAUDI RELATIONS. FROM NUMBER OF ANGLES, WE SEE AGREEMENT AS WHOLLY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR US INTERESTS IN AREA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ABU DH 01053 071428Z

2. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT DETAILS OF UAE-SAUDI AGREEMENT ARE OUT OF COUNTRY, SOME REMAINING IN ZAYID'S ENTOURAGE AS HE MAKES NORTH AFRICAN SWING, OTHERS PEELING OFF FOR VACATIONS IN EUROPE. WE HAVE STILL NOT SEEN MAP OF BORDER CHANGES AND THEREFORE CANNOT DESCRIBE THEM WITH ANY GREATER PRECISION THAN GENERAL DESCRIPTION PROVIDED REFTEL. ONLY FURTHER REPORT WE HAVE HEARD (AS YET UNCONFIRMED) IS THAT AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT OFF-SHORE RIGHTS ALONG SHORELINE CEDED TO SAUDI ARABIA ARE "UNAFFECTED", PERHAPS MEANING THAT ABU DHABI RETAINS THEM BEYOND NORMAL TERRITORIAL WATERS WHICH WE SUPPOSE WOULD HAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO SAUDI ARABIA ALONG WITH SHORELINE.

3. OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENT ARE BECOMING GENERALLY KNOWN AND THERE SEEMS SOLID LOCAL CONSENSUS THAT AGREEMENT IS EXCELLENT DEVELOPMENT FOR U.A.E. BOTH SHAIKHS RASHID OF DUBAI AND SULTAN OF SHARJAH, UPON WHOM I CALLED LAST FEW DAYS APPEARED UNRESERVEDLY HAPPY ABOUT AGREEMENT. I ASKED RASHID WHETHER AGREEMENT HAD LEFT ANY LOOSE ENDS HANGING, AND HE SAID, QUOTE NO, EVERYTHING IS SETTLED END QUOTE. RASHID SAID ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE AND HE EXPECTED STEP ACTUALLY TO BE TAKEN AT TIME AGREEMENT IS SIGNED IN SAUDI ARABIA.

4. ASSUMING AGREEMENT IS ALONG LINES WE HAVE REPORTED, AND THAT IT IS IMPLEMENTED IN GOOD FAITH BY BOTH SIDES, FURTHER SEVERAL DAYS' REFLECTION STRENGTHENS OUR BELIEF THAT IT REPRESENTS SOLID PLUS FOR US INTERESTS IN AREA, WITH FEW IF ANY NEGATIVE ASPECTS. MAIN ACHIEVEMENT, AS WE REPORTED EARLIER, IS REMOVAL OF DISPUTE WHICH TROUBLEMAKERS--WHETHER INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL--MIGHT SEEK TO EXPLOIT TO GAIN ADVANTAGE IN UAE. RESULTANT INCREASE IN STABILITY SHOULD IN TURN EASE TO SOME FURTHER DEGREE SHAH'S ANXIETY THAT BICKERING AMONG ARABS ON THIS SIDE OF GULF WILL MAKE AREA VULNERABLE TO GROWTH OF RADICAL AND/OR SOVIET INFLUENCE HERE. OF COURSE, AGREEMENT DOES NOT REMOVE THIS THREAT AND SHAHKLILL KNOW IT, BUT IT SEEMS TO US PROBABLE THAT TREND ALREADY UNDERWAY IN IRANIAN POLICY OF SEEKING AGREEMENTS WITH RULERS HERE (ALBEIT AFTER HARD BARGAINING) RATHER THAN PUSHING DISPUTES TO POINT OF CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ABU DH 01053 071428Z

ARMED CONFRONTATION, WILL NOW BE STRENGTHENED.

5. UAE-SAUDI RAPPROCHEMENT SHOULD ALSO HAVE STABILIZING EFFECT ON UAE FOREIGN POLICIES IN ARAB SPHERE. PART OF MOTIVATION BEHIND DISPOSITION OF ZAYID AND HIS ADVISORS TO ESTABLISH CORDIAL TIES WITH ARAB RADICALS (AS WELL AS CONSERVATIVES) HAS BEEN INSTINCTIVE SEARCH FOR SUPPORT WHEREEVER IT MIGHT BE FOUND TO FORESTALL SAUDI MOVE AGAINST HIM. WE WOULD

NOT REPEAT NOT EXPECT AGREEMENT TO BRING ABOUT DRAMATIC SHIFT
TOWARD CONSERVATIVE-ORIENTED OR ISOLATIONIST UAE POLICIES:
ZAYID WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE PRIDE IN MAINTAINING INDEPENDENT
FOREIGN POLICY, HE IS TEMPERMENTALLY PRONE TO PLAY ROLE IN
ARAB AFFAIRS, AND SEVERAL OF HIS INFLUENTIAL ADVISORS GENUINELY
SEE UAE AS BEST SERVED BY HAVING GOOD RELATIONS WITH EVERY-
BODY. THESE FACTORS WILL NOT CHANGE, BUT WITH SAUDI DISPUTE
RESOLVED, ZAYID SHOULD FEEL HIMSELF UNDER LESS PRESSURE,
WITH MORE SCOPE FOR BRINGING A CAREFUL PRAGMATIC JUDGMENT
TO BEAR ON HIS FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS. WE BELIEVE THIS WILL
MANIFEST ITSELF OVER TIME.

6. SAME ASPECT COULD, OVER LONG TERM, ALSO CONTRIBUTE O
INTERNAL COHESIVENESS OF FEDERATION. IF EFFECT OF SAUDI
CONNECTION IS TO REDUCE IN SOME MEASURE ZAYID'S INVOLVEMENTS
WITH ARAB RADICALS, IT WILL REMOVE ONE SOURCE OF UNEASI-
NESS THAT OTHER SHAIKHS HAVE FELT ABOUT COMMITTING THEM-
SELVES FULLY TO FEDERATION. BOTH SHAIKHS RASHID AND SAQR,
CONSERVATIVE ARAB RULERS IN THEIR OWN SEPARATE STYLES,
HAVE MAINTAINED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SAUDIS AND WILL FEEL
MORE COMFORTABLE ABOUT ZAYID IF THEY SEE HIM ALSO DRAWN INTO
THIS CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC WEB. RASHID TOLD ME WITH OBVIOUS
APPROVAL THAT PRINCE FAHD HAD TALKED TO ZAYID VERY SERIOUSLY
ABOUT WHAT HE SHOULD WATCH OUT FOR DURING HIS VISIT TO IRAQ.

7. SINGLY NONE OF THESE FACTORS SHOULD BE EXAGGERATED,
BUT TAKEN TOGETHER, THEY COALESCE INTO CURRENT WHICH WILL
MAKE ITS FORCE FELT AND WHICH WE SEE AS WHOLLY FAVORABLE
TO US POLICY PURPOSES IN THIS AREA.

STERNER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENTS, BOUNDARY CLAIMS, NEGOTIATIONS, BOUNDARIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 AUG 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: cunninfx
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ABUDH01053
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740215-1042
From: ABU DHABI
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740869/aaaacgyd.tel
Line Count: 145
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: ABU DHABI 1009
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: cunninfx
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 JUN 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <25 FEB 2003 by cunninfx>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FURTHER COMMENTS ON UAE-SAUDI AGREEMENT
TAGS: PFOR, TC, SA
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005